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SAVING OVERTON PARK A COMMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
DANIEL A. FARBERt
To date, cost-benefit analysis has played only a secondary role in
environmental law. Instead, regulations typically give a higher prior-
ity to environmental values than to monetary costs.' This refusal to
count environmental values as fully equivalent to money seems, at
first blush at least, inconsistent with economic models of rational
choice. Are our environmental laws (and most of our fellow citizens)
simply irrational?
This reluctance to trade other values for money goes by the gen-
eral name of incommensurability. A full treatment of incommensur-
ability in environmental law is beyond the scope of this Comment,
2
which instead will focus on the articles by Jason Johnston3 and
Richard Warner 4 in this Symposium. Both articles provide possible
justifications for society's reluctance to treat environmental harm as
simply another cost. Warner seeks to broaden our concept of ration-
ality to encompass more than the economic model of consumer
choice, while Johnston attempts to show how sophisticated economic
models might produce rules like those we see in environmental law.
This Comment will explore their efforts, which I find helpful but in-
complete (if only because neither theory takes advantage of the in-
sights offered by the other).
To assess these explanations, we need to take a close look at envi-
ronmental decisionmaking in some reasonably straightforward con-
text. To provide such a concrete context, I have chosen one of the
t Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School; HenryJ. Fletcher Professor of Law and
Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, University of Minnesota.
1 See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
2 For some earlier discussions of this topic, see CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT
Is OLDER THAN MAN (1993), and Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 834-40 (1994). In addition to these works, for a good in-
troduction to the incommensurability debate, see Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of
Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1520 (1992).
" Jason Scott Johnston, Million-Dollar Mountains: Pfices, Sanctions, and the Legal
Regulation of Collective Social and Environmental Goods, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1327 (1998).
4 Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Pol-
icy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1287 (1998).
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leading cases in administrative law, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe.5 Apart from its pivotal role in shaping the law of judicial re-
view of administrative action, Overton Park is also a revealing example
of how tradeoffs are made in environmental law. Part I examines how
the standards adopted in Overton Park (as well as in many environ-
mental statutes) privilege environmental values in ways that are at
odds with cost-benefit analysis and even with some theories of in-
commensurability. In Part II, I consider Warner's efforts to broaden
the concept of reasoned choice. Part III analyzes Johnston's effort to
accommodate contemporary environmental law within the rational
choice framework.
My goal here is quite limited. I do not attempt to offer a critique
of either Warner orJohnston on his own terms, by probing one's phi-
losophy or the other's economics. Nor do I question, for present
purposes, that the current regime of environmental law has some
claim to respect. It is possible, of course, that in a full-fledged analy-
sis of the subject, conventional cost-benefit analysis would emerge as
the victor, both in the academy as against theories like Warner's and
Johnston's, and in social desirability as against the current legal re-
gime. But those are larger issues that would take me outside the limi-
tations of this brief Comment.6
I. INCOMMENSURABILIIY AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
To place the issue in concrete context, we should begin by flesh-
ing out our case study. Overton Park arose from a dispute over high-
way construction in Memphis. 7 The plaintiffs challenged the decision
of the Secretary of Transportation to fund the construction of an in-
terstate highway through Overton Park. They invoked federal statu-
tory prohibitions on the use of federal funds for highways through
public parks (and certain other areas) "if a 'feasible and prudent' al-
ternative route exists. If no such route is available, the statutes allow
[the Secretary] to approve construction through parks only if there
has been 'all possible planning to minimize harm' to the 
park."8
5 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
6 My own views on these broader issues are set forth in DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 33-65, 89-125, on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review).
See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404-08.
Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted). For further background on the statute, see Peter
L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Ac-
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Although the case is best known for its holdings regarding the
availability and scope of judicial review,9 the immediate question be-
fore the Court was how to interpret this statutory ban. The govern-
ment argued that the Secretary had broad discretion, at least as to the
"prudence" prong of the statutory standard. It contended that the
Secretary "should weigh the detriment resulting from the destruction
of parkland against the cost of other routes, safety considerations, and
other factors, and determine on the basis of the importance that he
attaches to these other factors whether, on balance, alternative feasi-
ble routes would be 'prudent.""' But the Court concluded that "no
such wide-ranging endeavor was intended":"
Congress clearly did not intend that cost and disruption of the
community were to be ignored by the Secretary. But the very existence
of the statutes indicates that protection of parkland was to be given
paramount importance. The few green havens that are public parks
were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present in a
particular case or the cost or community disruption resulting from al-
ternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes.
12
Thus, the Court said, "[i]f the statutes are to have any meaning, the
Secretary cannot approve the destruction of parkland unless he finds
that alternative routes present unique problems.",3 On remand, the
Secretary disapproved construction of the highway, a decision that
was upheld by the lower courts.'
4
Overton Park involved a clash between two methods of making en-
vironmental decisions. In the government's view, the funding deci-
sion was highly discretionary, based on a case-by-case balancing of the
reasons for and against the route, seeking the best decision in light of
the balance of all reasons. This view is quite consistent with the usual
economic models of rational choice. Not surprisingly, the most ex-
plicit version of this balancing process in environmental law is cost-
tions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992) (arguing that the Court
miscomprehended congressional intent).
9 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (establishing judicial review of administrative
actions under the Administrative Procedure Act absent evidence of contrary congres-
sional intent).
'0 Id. at 411.
" Id.
1 Id. at 412-13 (footnotes omitted).
's Id. at 413.
'" See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th
Cir. 1974).
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benefit analysis, in which conflicting values are reduced to a mone-
tary metric.
It would be a mistake, however, to identify this balancing ap-
proach entirely with cost-benefit analysis. As recent work by Cass
Sunstein shows, balancing need not take the form of quantitative cost-
benefit analysis. Sunstein's views will help illuminate the relationship
between environmental policy and debates over incommensurability.
In particular, as Sunstein's work illustrates, not every version of in-
commensurability can explain the current regulatory regime.' Some-
thing more basic than the mere unavailability of a single metric must
be assumed to make sense of current law.
In his most recent work, Sunstein has called for a modified form
of cost-benefit analysis, which he has formulated in different ways.
Sunstein rejects the view that all values can be reduced to a monetary
metric. Indeed, he was one of the early legal scholars to embrace
some form of incommensurability.
1 6 Consequently, he does not en-
dorse economic efficiency as the sole basis of regulatory policy. He
does, however, call for expanded use of cost-benefit analysis at the
expense of more "absolutist"'
7 approaches to environmental regula-
tion. In one formulation, officials would engage in a "two-stage deci-
sion process. The first stage [w]ould consist of a [quantitative] cost-
benefit analysis ..... The second would introduce "other values, if
any are relevant, that [cost-benefit analysis] does not take into ac-
count."'8 Another formulation distinguishes between different types
of statutes. Some statutes, such as federal pesticide and toxics regula-
tions, are designed to overcome "market failures" such as "an absence
of sufficient information on the part of consumers, harms to third
parties, or collective action problems of various sorts."
9 For these
statutes, Sunstein says, "there is much to be said in favor of
[quantitative cost-benefit analysis], though it should be qualified with
a recognition that even for 'market failure' statutes, goals other than
those rooted in economic efficiency may legitimately bear on the de-
,' See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997)
[hereinafter FREE MARKETS].
lb See Sunstein, supra note 2 (suggesting that an understanding of incommensur-
ability may affect one's understanding of law).
17 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, in
FREE MARKETS, supra note 15, at 348, 370.
'8 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Experts, Economists, and Democrats, in FREE MARKETS, supra note
15, at 128, 139 (cowritten with Richard Pildes).
9 SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 368.
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cision."2 1 Other statutes, which currently are considered "absolutist,"
could be amended to allow balancing.2' In short:
It is therefore best for Congress to understand costs and benefits in
economic terms only for statutes that are designed to overcome market
failures. And even here, there is room for qualifying the economic
analysis-when, for example, the risk at issue is inequitably distributed,
and when political actors believe that it deserves special attention for
that reason. When the statute does not involve market failure, Congress
should still require cost-benefit balancing as the general backgrcund
rule; but it should understand the definition of costs and benefits to be
sufficiently wide open as to allow administrators to depart from purely
economic criteria.2
Hence, Sunstein calls for "a general background requirement of cost-
benefit balancing," with costs and benefits understood in an "open-
ended," not necessarily economic, sense; advocates a mandated "cost-
effectiveness" for all regulations; and seeks to require "more technical
cost-benefit balancing on a statute-by-statute basis, when there is a
considered legislative judgment that the statute is a response to a
market failure, economically defined. "23
In accordance with his view of incommensurability, Sunstein does
not suggest that environmental decisionmaking can be reduced to an
algorithm-like cost-benefit analysis, in which values are "measured"
literally in numerical terms. But he does adopt a "commensurable"
type of decisionmaking in the sense of calling for a balancing of rea-
sons in each case. By approaching problems in terms of balancing,
whether in terms of cost-benefit analysis or a more intuitive compari-
son of competing values, Sunstein suggests a stance of presumptive
neutrality on the part of the decisionmaker. In one formulation, the
decisionmaker actually begins by using the neutral technique of cost-
benefit analysis, and only then considers the impact of other values.
For statutes addressed to market failures-a category that he does not
define, but that seems to include toxics regulation and pollution laws,
judging from his examples-Sunstein seems to think that other values
will enter the analysis at all only in exceptional cases. For other stat-
utes, they will play a greater role. But in any of the formulations, the
decisionmaker clearly begins by open-mindedly assessing the values
20Id. at 369.
21 See id. at 369-70.
22Id. at 371.
Id. In connection with these reforms, Congress would set benchmark values of
$3 million to $10 million per life saved. See id.
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on each side of the balance, rather than beginning with a bias in ei-
ther direction.
This type of balancing is at odds with the approach adopted in
Overton Park, in which the decisionmaker is directed to begin with a
strong tilt in favor of preserving parklands. In this respect, Overton
Park is quite typical of environmental regulation generally. The envi-
ronmental commitments now embedded in federal law almost uni-
formly take an environmentalist baseline, with the presumption al-
ways being in favor of environmental protection and the burden of
proof resting on those arguing in favor of pollution. With notable
consistency, Congress has treated environmental risks as presump-
tively impermissible except when required by considerations of feasi-
bility. Rather than mandating the use of cost-benefit analysis, Con-
gress has adopted an environmental baseline for the control of air
and water pollution,24 for carcinogens in the workplace, and for
regulating hazardous waste sites,
2
6 but it rarely has called for cost-
27
benefit analysis or open-ended balancing. As Mark Sagoff has ar-
gued, this consistent statutory pattern bespeaks an implicit societal
commitment to environmental values.
28 Since Sagoff wrote, this pat-
tern has continued with the passage of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990.2 The result is to make environmental protection the
24 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976) (holding that the EPA may
not consider the economic feasibility of proposed state requirements); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that costs are relevant un-
der the Clean Water Act only if wholly out of proportion to benefits); Portland Ce-
mentAss'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting the industry's
argument for cost-benefit analysis under the Clean Air Act).
2 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1981)
(holding cost-benefit analysis impermissible under a statute regulating workplace ex-
posure to toxic chemicals).
The EPA is required to issue such standards governing waste disposal "as may be
necessary to protect human health and the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1994).
27 The closest approach to open-ended balancing probably is found in the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the federal pesticide statute. See 7 id.
§ 136a(a) (stating that EPA regulations are "to prevent unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment").
See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 179-80, 196-99, 207-08 (1988);
Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393 (1981).
2' 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671. For instance, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act contain extensive provisions relating to hazardous air pollutants. The amended
statute sets as a first goal the use of emission standards requiring:
[T]he maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pol-
lutants subject to this section (including a prohibition on such emissions,
where achievable) that the Administrator, taking into consideration the cost
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presumptive outcome, shifting the burden to those who advocate
other values.P
Environmental law thus seems to incorporate something like a
concept of incommensurability, and in a stronger form than
Sunstein's proposed approach to environmental policy. His version
of incommensurability does explain one feature of environmental
law, the limited role of cost-benefit analysis, but clearly does not ex-
plain the "thumb on the scale" in favor of environmental values in so
many regulations. Sunstein, of course, is quite aware that his ap-
proach varies from current environmental law, and suggests reforms
to bring the regulatory regime closer to his model. Sunstein may turn
out to be right that the system needs reform, but before we jump to
that conclusion, we should consider the possibility that other models
of incommensurability might provide a justification. In the remain-
der of this Comment, I explore whether Johnston's and Warner's
theories of incommensurability shed useful light on environmental
policy.
II. INCOMMENSURABILrIYAND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
In his contribution to this Symposium, Richard Warner continues
his work on incommensurability. Without pretending to do justice to
his full argument, I would like to focus on three theses that he puts
forward:
1. Incommensurability exists, and one important form can be
characterized by "reason-exclusion" 3-that is, when this kind of
"constitutive" incommensurability32 exists, certain possible reasons for
making a decision are excluded as irrelevant.
33
of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and en-
vironmental impacts and energy requirements, determines is achievable ....
Id. § 7412(d) (2). A second tier of standards are required if the first tier would leave
the most exposed individual with a greater than one-in-a-million lifetime risk of can-
cer. See id. § 7412(f) (2) (A); see also Huge Clean Air Bill's Toxics Title Sets New Tone for
Government Regulation, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1357, 1358 (Nov. 16, 1990). As one would
expect, this statute is questionable from the point of view of cost-benefit analysis. See
Paul R Portney, Policy Watch: Economics and the Clean AirActj. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1990,
at 173, 177-79 (estimating the benefits of the statute at zero to four billion dollars an-
nually and the costs at six to 10 billion dollars).
For an attempt to work through the policy implications of this commitment, see
FARBER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 89-185).
S Warner, supra note 4, at 1297.
-2 See id. at 1291-92.
" See id. at 1295, 1311.
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2. Such exclusions are grounded in our commitments, either in-
dividually or as a community.34
3. Given the existence of social disagreements over what reasons
should be excluded, public bodies have a responsibility to explain
their choices, not by comparing the strength of the reasons for differ-
ent options (which may be incommensurable), but in a different
sense. They should (a) show that their action rests on "undefeated
reasons,"35 and (b) undertake the "role of interpreters of society's
commitments."
36
How much can these theses help us understand environmental
decisions such as Overton Park?
As to the first thesis, the notion of "reason exclusion" is an inte-
gral part of the Court's decision. One of the government's arguments
was that the funding decision was "committed to agency discretion"
and hence unreviewable. The Court interpreted the Administrative
Procedure Act to preclude review only when "'statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'"
3 7 The
government's claim of open-ended discretion was advanced in sup-
port of this argument. By rejecting the argument, the Court held that
the agency's discretion indeed was confined because only a restricted
category of reasons could justify using parkland under the statute.
The Court then remanded for a determination of "whether the Secre-
tary properly construed his authority" and whether he "could have
reasonably believed that in this case there are no feasible alternatives
or that alternatives do involve unique problems."38 The lower court
was then to consider whether the decision manifested "a clear error
of judgment."' 9 Thus, most of the conceivable reasons for the park
route were excluded as irrelevant, and the Secretary was required to
show that he in fact had made a reasonable decision based on the
small range of permissible reasons.
This was clearly a "reason-excluding" decision in the sense of pre-
cluding many explanations for the decision: "The park was cheaper,"
"otherwise, more people would have to move," and so forth. On the
other hand, cost and community dislocation were not precluded ab-
' See id. at 1297-98, 1324.
m Id. at 1323.
36 Id. at 1324.
37 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)




solutely as considerations, if they could be characterized as extraordi-
nary. Perhaps this falls short of the full scope of what Warner consid-
ers to be "reason exclusion," but in any event, the general concept
seems to be helpful in understanding the case and the larger body of
environmental law that Overton Park exemplifies.
Warner's second thesis is that reasons are excluded for purposes
having to do with how individuals or communities view their identi-
ties. Parks serve obvious functions as public places in the life of local
communities, and some consideration of this fact may have been in
the background. More notably, the Court clearly was defining the na-
tional community as one that valued "green havens"40 as much as busy
highways-or perhaps it would be more precise to say that the Court
interpreted the statute as resting on such a community definition.
Indeed, it is worth noting, the opening sentence of the opinion reads:
"The growing public concern about the quality of our natural envi-
ronment has prompted Congress in recent years to enact legislation
designed to curb the accelerating destruction of our country's natural
beauty."4' Thus, the Court situated its discussion in the context of the
community's embrace of environmental values.
It is when we get to Warner's third thesis that his argument, and
its relevance to environmental law, becomes more difficult to assess.
What could the Court say to someone who questioned the priority
given to parks and the consequent exclusion of many reasons for
choosing parklands as highway routes? 42 Warner says that the legisla-
tive choice is rational if it is backed by "reasons that are not defeated
by, or inferior to, any other reasons."43  Of course, the opposing
choice might have been just as rational, based on the same standard.
This leaves rather mysterious the process by which such decisions are
'0 The dissentingjudge in the court of appeals put it this way:
[P] ublic parkIands are the only remaining weekend sanctuaries for vast num-
bers of city dwellers from the polluted urban sprawl. A threat to a neighbor-
hood parkland is a threat to the health, happiness, and peace of mind of all
the neighborhood people .... At the very least, procedural due process means
that the people of this country be listened to, and heard, on matters affecting
their daily lives as directly as the environment in which they live.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1318 (6th Cir. 1970)
(Celebrezze,J., dissenting), rev'd 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
"' Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404 (footnote omitted). The accompanying footnote
cites the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and two less prominent statutes.
See id. at 404 n.1.
42 Of course, one thing that the Court could say is that it merely was following the
will of Congress, but this only pushes back the question one step to the legislators.
45 Warner, supra note 4, at 1322-23.
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to be made or how one is to justify making one choice rather than
another.
Perhaps such decisions are irreducibly mysterious. We do not
really know what made a large number of people in the late 1960s de-
cide that environmental protection was a pressing priority, whereas
previously they had equated social progress with economic welfare
and national security. Even in considering the more familiar prob-
lem of how judges decide hard cases-for all the talk about coher-
ence, narrative, practical reason, and so forth-we have difficulty say-
ing anything specific about the process of decision. Warner suggests
that what is involved is a creative reformation of existing commit-
ments, which is probably correct but still rather vague. Today, in the
environmental area, we can point, with some assurance, to an existing
societal commitment to environmental quality, and (in my view at
least) the reasons adduced for abandoning the commitment are not
compelling." So at least, on Warner's view, there is no rational rea-
son for rejecting this commitment. But the question of how this
commitment should be interpreted and applied is less easily ad-
dressed, let alone the question of how the community should explain
itself to dissenters who fail to share the same commitment.
Warner does a considerable service by making the "plea for self-
conscious attention to such questions,"
4 ' and perhaps there is little
that can be said in the abstract about these questions. Without a
more compelling account of how we make and justify the adoption
and reinterpretation of basic commitments, however, advocates of in-
commensurability probably will be unable to quiet the doubts of
"rational choicers" about whether reason can exist without commen-
surability. At present, the best normative case for incommensurability
seems to be the unpalatability of the opposing model, but however
inevitable, this is not an entirely satisfactory state of affairs.
III. INCOMMENSURABILITY AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE
For Warner, the role of incommensurability in social policy flows
from its role in individual decisionmaking. Johnston suggests that so-
ciety might adopt what appears to be a form of incommensurability,
44 See FARBER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 89-125).
Warner, supra note 4, at 1325.
SAVING OVERTONPARK
even if individuals all follow the standard economic model of rational
choice. 6
Because of its complexity, it is difficult to reduce Johnston's ar-
gument to a set of simple theses that then could be compared with
current environmental law. Instead, for purposes of seeing the utility
of his approach, we might ask what kind of story Johnston could tell
about Overton Park. In particular, how can we explain the decision to
allow park routes only to avoid extraordinary social costs, rather than
balancing the benefits produced by the park against the incremental
costs of using a different route?
Some additional details about the park and the highway decision
may be helpful in this regard. The plan was to build a six-lane high-
way through the park, which the court of appeals described as a "342
acre; municipally owned park in midtown Memphis used for a zoo, a
9-hole golf course and other recreational purposes."47 The alternative
routes would have cost significantly more, and would also have de-
stroyed, for example, two schools, three churches, forty-six businesses,
and residences occupied by more than 3000 people.48 The state paid
the city (which approved the route) $2 million for the twenty-six acres
of parkland; the city promptly spent half for a 160-acre golf course
and held on to most of the rest.4 9 As to the impact of the highway on
the park, officials in the Department of the Interior indicated that the
park's values would be "'seriously impaired"' and that "'there won't
be much left in the way of a wooded park left in Overton Park after an
interstate Highway is routed through it."'' 0
4 Perhaps I should begin by saying that this seems a promising route of attack on
general grounds. Rational choice theory has a well-developed model for individual
decisions, but it is much less clear what it means to behave rationally in group situa-
tions. Game theory often provides multiple equilibria, with no clear ground for choos-
ing among them, which means that even knowing all of the relevant resources and
constraints, we cannot say with assurance what course of action would be adopted by a
group of rational individuals. That in turn seemingly means that the economic defini-
tion of rationality, as applied to groups, is incomplete. In some circumstances, at least,
it is not implausible that a rational equilibrium might produce behavior that resembles
the behaviors we would find if individual values were incommensurable. In particular,
as Johnston argues, we might find situations in which sales of some commodities were
blocked, regulatory sanctions were used instead of pricing mechanisms, and quanti-
fication of benefits was eschewed.
4 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1309 (6th Cir.
1970), reu'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
'a See id. at 1311.
4 See id. at 1312 n.8.
'0 Id. at 1317 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (quoting letters from the Department of
the Interior).
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Johnston's analysis suggests that we should focus on the difficulty
of measuring the benefits of the park, and the ways in which mone-
tary transactions might undermine the social value of the park. Begin
with the former: Why not simply charge admissions and thereby de-
termine how much the public values picnics, frisbee games, and the
like? Johnston's theory is complex, but I take it that he would argue
along the following lines. First, some uses of the park are relational;
prolonged use may be needed before people develop attachments to
particular parts of the park and discover activities that they find espe-
cially rewarding. These relational benefits are hard to price, and pric-
ing other benefits might in the long run discourage the development
of such relational uses.5 AsJohnston puts it:
By forbidding money to be exchanged for any aspect of the collectively
held external world (including, importantly, any product of individual
interaction with it), we force the same sort of costly search, matching,
and barter process that occurs with human friendship and marriage.
We obligate individuals to find those collective resources that best suit
their own preferences, resources, and capabilities. They must seek
those resources that are best able to reciprocate the individuals' own
cares and concerns, not in terms of money, but in experience. As in our
most treasured human relationships, our relationships with collective
environmental goods are where we learn about the complexity of the
external environment, and about how to negotiate a cooperative rela-
tionship with that environment 5'
This is not a completely unrealistic description as applied to a park.
(One imagines someone discovering a favorite little corner of Central
Park.) And perhaps charging for park access would impair such rela-
tionships, making the park experience too "recreational" and pushing
the park managers toward a Disneyland type of development. Per-
haps it is relevant in this regard that when given cash in exchange for
the Memphis parkland, the only portion of the money used for any
immediate purpose was spent on a golf course. But it is hard to know
just how powerful a factor this might be in explaining our refusal to
monetize the values produced by parks.
A second factor in Johnston's analysis is the difficulty that the
park managers would face in obtaining accurate information about
the preferences of park users. It turns out to be difficult, if not im-
possible, to develop a schedule of prices and resource qualities that
-" SeeJohnston, supra note 3, at 1342-43.
52 Id. at 1344.
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will lead buyers to reveal accurately their preferences.03 It may be
more feasible to charge a price based on the cost of the individual's
activities in terms of interference with the preference of others, but
this becomes increasingly difficult, the more varied the preferences
and more complex the interactions involved."'
Both for users and regulators, the informational costs are com-
pounded by the complexity of the interactions among different us-
ers.55 To learn the mutual compatibility ofjogging, picnics, and bon-
gos, we need to have the opportunity for seeing them interact in
different settings over significant periods of time. The "social ecol-
ogy" of the park may be quite complex, and it may be difficult to sort
out the relevant relationships.
All of this adds up, in Johnston's view, to an explanation for our
use of sanctions rather than prices to control environmental harms:
We regulate use not because we are certain of the collective impact of
alternative types and levels of individual interaction with the environ-
ment, but rather because we are not. Because of that same uncertainty,
we prefer sanctions to pricing due to our certainty that a use should not
be permitted only if it is a gross departure from, or completely unlike,
those uses that experience has indicated are generally protective of the
environment. We use sanctions because environmental regulation is in-
tended to preserve the diversity, variability, and duration, not of the
natural environment, but of human relationships with it. We use sanc-
tions, finally, because we do not want to create incentives for our collec-
tive agents to derive revenues from increases in the level of harmful ac-
tivities, but to detect levels and uses that threaten too much harm."'
How useful is all of this as an explanation for why we do not try to
price park activities? One easily could add a list of other economic
factors: the costs of controlling access and monitoring activities for
conformity with the admission ticket; the possible positive externali-
ties (people may find the park more fun, as well as feel safer, if there
are other people present); and the possible public-choice problems
that might lead park officials to misprice activities. There are also
noneconomic factors, particularly the importance of parks as expres-
sions of community identity. Still, Johnston's analysis does seem to
shed light on some significant factors that might otherise go unno-
ticed.
See id. at 1347-50.
'4 See id. at 1348-49.
s Seeid at 1351.
Id. at 1329.
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Johnston's larger point is that information problems may help
explain some of the contours of environmental law. In particular, he
explores the decision to sanction large deviations from acceptable
uses rather than use a pricing mechanism to affect activity levels.57
Imagine that, instead of virtually banning conversion of parks to
highways, Congress had attempted to impose a pricing mechanism,
under which states would pay for choosing park routes in terms of
lowered grants. (The rationale might be that governments might suf-
fer from a form of fiscal illusion, counting the expense of acquiring
private land as a cost of highway development but undervaluing the
costs of harm to parks.5) One advantage to this system is that it could
cover all forms of harm to parks, including the disruptions caused by
roadways near (rather than through) parkland. Johnston is probably
right that at least one reason we do not do this is the difficulty of
properly assessing the relevant costs. Building a highway through
part of Overton Park not only eliminates that part of the park but af-
fects the social ecology of the rest of the park, disrupting established
use patterns in ways that may be hard to forecast, with impacts on in-
dividuals that may be hard to measure. So perhaps, as Johnston says,
we impose sanctions on extreme deviations from current use because
we presumptively find them harmful, but are unable to assess minor
changes.
It seems intuitively clear that Warner's analysis captures aspects of
our feelings about parks that are slighted byJohnston. On the other
hand, Johnston's analysis does cause us to think in a fresh way about
some of the issues, conceptualizing effects on parks in a manner that
otherwise might not occur to us. Thus, both analyses have potential,
but much more would have to be done to test them. In particular, a
more careful examination of the facts surrounding Overton Park is re-
quired to determine whether either analysis actually succeeds as an
account of the federal legislation and its judicial application. To test
Warner's theory, we would need a deeper understanding of the nor-
mative reasoning underlying the decisions of the various bodies in-
volved, be they legislative, administrative, or judicial. To assess John-
ston's theory, we also would need real evidence, rather than the
57 See id. at 1355-58.
A failure to appreciate fully public benefits also might occur with highways, but
presumably would be balanced by the political clout of the highway construction and
trucking industries.
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speculation I have offered here, about the modalities of park uses and
the difficulties of quantifying their interactions and benefits.
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If we are to make further progress on understanding incommen-
surability and its relationship to law, I suspect, we will need some sus-
tained studies of legal decisions, combining theoretical sophistication
like Warner's and Johnston's with detailed descriptions of specific
cases. Only then will we be in a position to determine the extent to
which specific versions of incommensurability actually can shed light
on some key features of our legal system. The articles in this Sympo-
sium, however, give grounds for hope that the results of that investi-
gation would be illuminating.
'9 Some advocates of incommensurability might argue that the kind of empirical
analysis given by Johnston ultimately would erode our attachment to deeper environ-
mental values, in the same way that cost-benefit analysis sometimes is feared to destroy
unquantifiable dimensions of activities and relationships. I do not believe, however,
that sensible policymakers can afford to ignore the instrumental effects of their deci-
sions, nor do I think that our values are so fragile as to be destroyed by the taint of
such "practical" concerns.
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